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Abstract
My project had dual aims in computing and cryptography. Accordingly, I
conducted research and published three papers in each of these two areas.
It is well-known that solving nonlinear (equivalently quadratic) systems
over a finite field is NP-complete, hence all deterministic solvers must be at
least exponential. However, how quickly you can solve these systems on av-
erage and how is an important and long-standing problem.
Usually these equations are solved with Gro¨bner Bases. In 2000, Courtois,
Klimov, Patarin and Shamir proposed the related XL method, a variant of
which is claimed to solve a generic system in probabilistic polynomial time. I
published the first mathematical analysis of XL last year at ACISP 2004. Dur-
ing the course of this project, I presented more results at ICICS 2004, ICISC
2004 and MEGA 2005, which refuted Shamir’s claim. I also refuted Courtois’
claims of using XL variants to cryptanalyze other public-key cryptosystems.
My other research was concentrated in the area of public-key cryptosys-
tems. A subclass of public-key cryptosystems called multivariates or MQ
schemes are attracting more attention because they are efficient for low-
resource use and resists attacks using Quantum Computers. I proposed a
new subclass of multivariates called tame-like, and analyzed their security.
I also showed that they have desirable properties for efficiency, and this is
well-received by the international cryptology community in general.
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Î Buchberger Õ°, Õ ×
Gro¨bner Ã9O¼9ôbÝ;—
ãó. Lazard 3 1983 èÝ§¡
([21]) tﬀ¥±sò, ôµÎ XL
õ F4-F5 ÝŁ]PÕ°
3
XL: XL (eXtended Linearization, ;
¨aP;, [6]) ]°3 1999 OG
¡ã Courtois, Klimov, Patarin
 Shamir è (Ars xù XL
Î Lazard \s¨Ý, [1])
32000-04 ﬁ Courtois è¿
Í, Ít¥ŁÝÎ FXL
F4-F5: J.-C. Fauge`re | F5 Õ°g
)ó<\ÓŁÝ HFE Ã;×r
([14, 15, 16])3jös"¼Ý





ﬃs F4 T F5 Õ°
XL õÆ (FXL, XLF, XFL, XSL,
XL’, XL2 —  [4, 7, 8]) ¥aP;
(relinearization, [20]) ;¼XL
vE®Ýæ§Ag: '&ÆbÃ
K îÝ n Íó x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
Ý m ÍÞg (?{gôv«) ]P
`1(x) = `2(x) = · · · = `m(x) = 0, v
n ≤ m, £ D gÝ XL E®Aì:




2 · · · xαnn (;ðB® xα, &
ÆŁO4Ýgó
∑
i αi ≤ D− 2),
¶|N×Í]P `j = 0;
2. ÏÞM»Î L, L îaP; (lin-



















D f (9Íì§3 |K| ≤ D `ôº
K), &Æâ x1 |²¢
óÝ4, Çß× x1 Ý]P,
¬3O x1 ¡ßÕNÍó
3 Courtois sÝ XL Ý
, qAåßWÕÝt@~
([2, 37, 38, 41]),tbàÝÎ FXL: ‘F’
î Fix, 3 m = n ` XL ÆR¼§
X|Õ f Íó¯óÝÍ
ó°, Q¡þ XL :, s¨^bŁ
µ, Courtois æÍï?Ý f Ç
¾Õ?Ý, ÌßÝ@~s¨E
y×Í×PÝ]à, Äm9
×Íõ n lWÑf»Ý f ÍóÎ
t·ÝÍ¿Í;Kbà
Fauge`re Ý [14] . Buchberger Ý
Gro¨bner Ã9Õ°§¡.
×M,
èÝ F4 °õ Courtois è¼Ý
XL+XL2 bÚ58« ([8]), Ç{
g4, Q¡bÙÝà&ó¶
¡yì¼Ý±g]P, ¥Ý




Sydney .Ý MAGMA ([22]), ¸à;




? uÎ, J F5 î?ó (Ìß
(h° FF5, [38]) 	E×Ý]
àÝt·óC, AÍ, JT2à FXL
2.2 XL ó<\ÝxŁ§
ÌßÞî;CÝxŁ¯Byì:
Theorem 1 (Yang-Chen, [37, 38]). 
[u]s :=  u 3 s Ý"PÝ;ó.
T = [tD]
(1− tq)n
(1− t)n+1 ; (1)











P T, I 54}ñÝ]PÝÀó,
t¡×PG3 (`i) !J`Wñ, X|
\mŁ1¹Ñ,EÝ (q À 1),
T − I = [tD] ((1− t)m−n−1 (1 + t)m) . (2)
êA C. Diem Ý [10], Fro¨berg 






























hn,1 :=Ï nÍ Hermite94P Hn Ý
tq =
√
2n+ 1 +O(n−1/6) [32].
Theorem 3 (Yang-Chen, [38]). FXL,
Ç f Íóþ XL, Î	 m ∼ n
Ý XLt·à°,vlît· f ∝ n
Theorem 4 (Yang-Chen, [37, 38]). E
Courtois hèÝ XFL, XLF, XL2 and
XL’ Ý]°, Ìßb: [4, 8]:
• XFLy|è ðã` ÝFXL
• XLFõ XL’ ÕGf FXL 
• A¸à XL+XL2, EXbÝóE
®¬©t{g4,!y F4
Theorem 5 (Diem-Yang, 2004).
Courtois-Shamir , Ç FXL 39
4P` /ŁÞg]à [6], Ë
2.3 ">HÝó)a TTS
ýãÝ92ÐÙâ×Í|î&
aPÌ ô3ËÍaPÌ ﬁ , h
ÁûÅÝÚx, 2Ð39-ÛDÙ
/×ÍÌ | V : w ∈ Kn φ1→
x
φ2→ y φ3→ z ∈ Km PD3; P, K
×b§, ÇXÛÃ (base field),
|K| = q, ¢ó n  m 5½)(TZ
 s (signature or plaintext block) õ
Z`TÛZ s (digest or ciphertext
block) ﬁî, Ì φ1 : w 7→ M1w + c1
 φ3 : y 7→ M3y + c3 ¿à(aP), φ2
&aP×, ÌßÞ V ¨W













;ó Pik, Qik, Rijk  mn(n + 3)/2
ÍÇ2ÐÎp M−11 , M
−1
3 , '
c1, c3, Xb φ2 ÝJ¢ó{Ð
(;ðã c3 ¸ V (0) = 0)ÛDÙﬁH
PÞ,yŁ V (w) = z ]àÞ V
æWÍëI	 φ3 ◦ φ2 ◦ φ1 ﬁÓ





tion), ;¼¿à, TXÛ de Jonquiere
ëlÌ , ùÇ¥4&W	5¡E
N× i b yi = xi + pi(x1, . . . , xi−1) Ý
x, Í& pi 94P, ñhJ y
|¶ï5Ł x ﬁ&W	, ¬ÍY








TTS, TÌ TTS/5 [39], b9Ë¢
ó, 	n = 28, m = 20 TÌ φ2Aì:
yi = xi +
P7
j=1 pijxjx8+(i+j mod 9), i = 8 · · · 16;
y17 = x17 + p17,1x1x6 + p17,2x2x5 + p17,3x3x4
+p17,4x9x16 + p17,5x10x15 + p17,6x11x14 + p17,7x12x13;
y18 = x18 + p18,1x2x7 + p18,2x3x6 + p18,3x4x5
+p18,4x10x17 + p18,5x11x16 + p18,6x12x15 + p18,7x13x14;
yi = xi + pi,0xi−11xi−9 +
Pi−1
j=19 pi,j−18 x2(i−j)−(i mod 2) xj
+pi,i−18x0xi +
P27
j=i+1 pi,j−18 xi−j+19 xj , i = 19 · · · 27.
TTS/5 ®ßÐEﬁ:  ^ ó 
è (full-rank) ﬁ]p M1, M3,
' c1, &ëﬁ¢ó pij, i =
8 · · · 27Õ V = φ3 ◦φ2 ◦φ1 ¬!
`Ãó c3 ¸ V Ýðó4 0, 
Õ M−11 , M
−1
3 , &¢óõ c1, c3 )





' z ∈ K20 ﬁW	;
2. ¸à{ÐÝ£]ßW y =
M−13 (z + c3) ∈ K20 (¥ y ﬁ
ý;ã 8 · · · 27);
3. ^ã x1, . . . , x7 ∈ K, ¬
Ł x8, . . . , x16 bŁc
4. Ł¡µŁ x17, x18
 ¡  ^ ã x0, ¬  Ł
x19, . . . , x27 ∈ K, ¥Õ
Łc (t9G 9 Í x0 ¸
PëÆâ~bŁ)
5. Õ w = M−11 (x+c1) ∈ K28
TTS/5 ﬁaW: [ãZ)a
à (M,w), B SHA-1 Ó/Ðó






ØË@g (recursive) ÝWßÕ JÌ
vá (tame-like) ÝÙ
válêÌûvl, !òyhvÝ





Ðt"Ý]PÎ Wolf Ý]° [35], Íß
W` Î Θ(n6), . . .
Theorem 6 (Yang-Chen-Chen, [39,
40]). váÝ2ÐÛDÙ|3
o(n5) ` WßW2Ð
®°Aì, ENEý i < j, |!




[pi ((M1)αi(M1)βj + (M1)αj(M1)βi)]





P õ Q ûhhX| TTS  TRMS ﬁ
ÈÇ`Ý (real-time) ßWÐ
Theorem 7 (Yang-Chen, [39]). 	v
álÙXmÝH C:
1. 	T94Pà)tÝè
 r ï, ÍETÕ!Ýmè b
k Í,  ` = dm/ne, J









) ≥ C. (6)
3.  v ¸N×ÍTðÝø
ü4Äb×ý3 A ⊂ {0≤ i<n}
, A âÝtKóÍó, J1
q2v−n−1(n− v)4 ≥ C. (7)
4.  D0 : min{D : [tD]
(









qk·mγ0T ω(c0+c1 lg T ) ≥ C. (8)























¸àÌb 256 byte on-chip RAM Ý
i8052, ßWÐõ)aÝPÀ 3.1
kB, ¨6 2.7 kB EEPROM B7
H, '¸à 8 kB EEPROM, Jy
2.2 kB Ùà2ÐP°×gß
W, Ä6| 20 -à (byte) 5
W 434 gßW, | 120 T 240 bytes
×ð×ðãîX, Rﬁ¡, ñÐ






þ)ô»îò; !`, 8051 b×
¢óÌ“Tó”, ;ð¼¸à
¿Í`, hÂ÷î µC ÷{
j, Intel 8051AH T 8052AH ;Á±
jï, “12T”, îX Winbond T
- “4T”, !øPÆ>"
ë¹Infineon SLE-66 -“3T”
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Scheme Platform (T number) Clock PrKey Code RAM Tsign
TTS (20, 28)
Intel 8032AH (12)
3.57 MHz 1.4 kB
1.4 kB 256 B 144 ms
Intel 8051AH (12)




TTS (24, 32) 85 ms
Intel 8051AH (12)
227 ms
ESIGN 336 B 3.0 kB 800 B 12.0 s
SFLASHv2 2.4 kB 3.3 kB 344 B
1.07 s











RSA-2048 640 B 1.1 s
ECDSA-163
10 MHz
21 B 159 ms
ECDSA-191 24 B 180 ms
NTRU-Sign Philips 8051 (6) 16 MHz 100 B 5 kB 800 B 160 ms
Table 1: 8051 î&Ë)aÙÝ@®£]
9
ºÈ O	→ ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05
PKC
(O)
7FSó 30 61 – 67 69 105 106 128
#åSó 15 25 – 30 26 26 32 32
#å£% 50 41 – 45 38 25 31 25
ACISP
(Ú`)
7FSó 66 53 81 91 94 158 195 185
#åSó 35 26 37 38 36 42 41 45
#å£% 53 49 46 42 38 26 21 24
CHES
(Ï)
7FSó – 42 51 66 101 111 125 –
#åSó – 27 25 31 39 32 32 –
#å£% – 64 49 45 39 29 26 –
ICICS
(10`)
7FSó – 87 62 134 161 176 248 –
#åSó – 37 24 58 41 37 42 –
#å£% – 43 39 43 25 21 17 –
ICISC
(12`)
7FSó 53 61 56 107 142 163 190 –
#åSó 18 20 20 32 35 34 34 –
#å£% 34 33 36 30 25 21 18 –
Table 2: t×°»jÛD£GH@DºÝã£
Scheme Signature PublKey SecrKey Setup Signing Verifying
RSA-PSS 1024 bits 128 B 320 B 2.7 sec 84 ms 2.0 ms
ECDSA 326 bits 48 B 24 B 1.6 ms 1.9 ms 5.1 ms
ESIGN 1152 bits 145 B 96 B 0.21 sec 1.2 ms 0.74 ms
QUARTZ 128 bits 71.0 kB 3.9 kB 3.1 sec 11 sec 0.24 ms
SFLASHv2 259 bits 15.4 kB 2.4 kB 1.5 sec 2.8 ms 0.39 ms
TTS(20,28) 224 bits 8.6 kB 1.3 kB 1.5 ms 51 µs 0.11 ms
TTS(24,32) 256 bits 13.4 kB 1.8 kB 2.5 ms 67 µs 0.18 ms
Table 3: TTS õNESSIE i)aÙXóï3 500MHz Pentium III Ýf´
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